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Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:
How the Supreme Court Eroded Labor
Law and Workers Rights in the Name of
Immigration Policy
Thomas J. Walsh*
Put yourself in the shoes of a factory manager. Like all
businesspeople, you are trying your best to minimize costs while
maintaining high levels of production. Your factory produces
chemicals for other companies. The work is difficult and the
environment is harsh. Your workforce consists largely of recent
immigrants because most anybody who can get another job does.
Many of the employees do not speak any English. You suspect
most are in the country illegally, but all their papers checked out.
Imagine that one day you hear rumors that a local labor
organization is trying to organize your factory. Simply stated,
your life would be much easier without a union. Consequently,
you ponder how to persuade your employees to stay away from the
union. Paying them more, increasing benefits, or reducing the
workload are possibilities, but they cost money. Then it hits you,
fire one of the illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrant workers have
the normal fear of losing their job, plus they face the threat of
deportation. Those remaining will never try to unionize again.
What is the worst that can happen? You fire the workers. They
get deported. You get told not to do it again. That is it.
As reprehensible as the behavior of the manager is in this
scenario, this conduct is possible after the Supreme Court's
decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB. 1 Jos6
Castro worked at the Hoffman factory and was fired after
becoming involved in a union organizing campaign. 2 The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB)3 found Castro's dismissal a
*J.D. expected 2004, University of Minnesota Law School. B.S. 2000, magna cum
laude, University of Minnesota. I would like to thank the staff and editors of Law
and Inequality, especially Jaynie Leung and Nicole Lexvold, for their work on my
article. Finally, I would like to say a special thanks to my family and friends.
Without their love and support this article would not have been possible.
1. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
2. Id. at 140.
3. For the purposes of this article "NLRB" will refer to the government agency's
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violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 4 Until the
hearing to determine his backpay, Hoffman had been acting in
violation of the NLRA and was facing punishment for its actions. 5
At the hearing it was discovered that Castro was in the country
illegally and illegally working for Hoffman, which changed the
nature of the case. 6
Hoffman appealed the Board's order of backpay to the
Supreme Court arguing that Castro could not receive backpay
under Sure-Tan v. NLRB.7 Hoffman's theory was that because
Castro was not available to work, he could not receive backpay.8
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) argued Sure-Tan did
not apply and that awarding backpay upheld the policies of both
the NLRA and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA).9 After the discovery of his immigration status, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding at the hearing denied
Castro backpay. 10 The Board later reversed the ALJ's ruling and
awarded Castro backpay.'1
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's position, reversing
the order of backpay. 12 Relying on Southern S.S. v. NLRB, 13 the
Court found the Board overstepped its authority by rewarding
Castro for an illegal act.14 The Court held that denying backpay
promoted the policies of the IRCA. 15
Part I of this article details the legal and cultural
environment of the decision.1 6 Part II explains the arguments
administrative functions. "Board" will also be used when referring to the judicial
review body of the NLRB.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2002); Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
5. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141.
6. Id.
7. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S.
137 (2002) (No. 00-1595).
8. Id. (arguing that since Castro was illegally in the country, he was unavailable
to work).
9. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986); Brief for Respondent at 12-16, Hoffman Plastic Compound v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595).
10. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 152.
13. 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (ignoring the issue of backpay and limiting the Board's
authority to order reinstatement for workers discharged for striking because the
strike violated the mutiny statute).
14. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 (holding the Board's decision was counter to federal
immigration law).
15. Id. at 149 (stating that congressional intent was to punish immigrants that
illegally obtain employment).
16. See infra notes 20-86 and accompanying text.
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made to the court, the holding, and the reasoning in Hoffman.17
Part III criticizes the Court's decision arguing the Court wrongly
interpreted the case law, immigration policy, labor policy, and
administrative law thdt the Court itself developed.18 More
importantly, this article argues the Court's decision exposes an
already vulnerable group of people to further abuses by
unscrupulous employers and diminishes the rights of all
employees to collectively bargain.
I. BACKGROUND
A. IMMIGRATION AND LABOR IN 2002
Every year large numbers of undocumented workers 19 come
to work in the United States. 20  Whether the impact of
undocumented workers is ultimately positive or negative is subject
to vigorous public debate.2 1 A traditional view is that immigrants
17. See infra notes 87-139 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 140-221 and accompanying text.
19. In this article, undocumented workers are defined as immigrants illegally
residing and working in the United States. Writings on the subject often use the
terms "illegal alien," "illegal immigrant," and "undocumented worker"
interchangeably.
20. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates 275,000
undocumented workers enter the United States every year, adding to the six
million that already reside in the United States. See Nancy Cleeland, AFL-CIO
Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al. The
U.S. economy is dependent on the contribution of illegal immigrants. See Julia
Malone, Report: U.S. Relies Heavily on Illegal Workers: Half on Farm, 25% in
Home, 10% in Eateries, ATLANTA J-CONST., Mar. 22, 2002, at A6 (citing a
nationwide study finding 4% of the urban workforce is illegal).
21. Opponents contend illegal immigration "costs many Americans jobs, tax
dollars, educational opportunities, and quality of life." Dan Stien, Illegal
Immigration, Amnesty Hurt Millions of Americans, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug.
13, 2001, at All. Immigration and its impact on the United States has been a
controversial issue in political elections. See Marc Sandalow, GOP Divided Over
Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1996, at A2 (discussing then Republican
presidential candidate Pat Buchanan's call for a five-year moratorium on legal
immigration and plan to build wall along the U.S.-Mexico border to keep out
"Jose"). In more recent times, reform of immigration policy has focused more on
inclusion in the political process rather than exclusion. See Dan Eggen & Darryl
Fears, Bush Weighs Legal Status of Mexicans: Illegal Immigrants May Get
Residency, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at Al (explaining President George W. Bush
was considering granting amnesty to 3 million illegal immigrants). While opinions
vary, there is some indication that the general public does not oppose increased
immigration. See Howard LaFranchi, Support Grows for Immigration, but
Reservations Linger, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 2001, at 2 (citing a
University of Chicago study finding that less than half of all Americans want to cut
immigration, a significant drop from a survey conducted several years ago).
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take jobs from American workers;22 however, this may not actually
be true. 23 Illegal immigrants may compete, if at all, for jobs with
lower skilled native workers.2 4 Evidence shows that immigrants
may actually add significant value to the economy while receiving
little economic benefit in return.25 Others argue the economy
suffers by not reaping the benefits of the undocumented workers.
2 6
For years, labor unions were squarely against granting any
rights to undocumented workers and advocated for strengthening
immigration laws under the belief that immigrants take American
jobs.2 7 Although that traditional sentiment still exists among
22. Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 350 (1994) (identifying
displacement of American workers as a "consistent justification for those favoring
laws precluding the employment of unauthorized workers"); Karen Weinstock,
Editorial, Immigrants' Contribution to Economy Can't Be Ignored, ATLANTA J-
CONST., Sept. 23, 2002, at A9 (stating that the opinion that immigrants take jobs
from American workers is not a new phenomenon, but that the terrorist attacks of
2001 and a slow economy have made this viewpoint more common).
23. See Larry J. Obhof, The Irrationality of Enforcement? An Economic Analysis
of U.S. Immigration Law, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 168 (2002) (using
empirical analysis to conclude "even a significant increase in the number of
immigrants has negligible effects on the average wage of natives" and little impact
on employment rates of native workers).
24. Illegal aliens are often willing to take difficult, low-paying jobs that many
native workers will not take. See Weinstock, supra note 22. See also Dick Meister,
Influx of Immigrants Offers U.S. Unions a Great Opportunity, BUFFALO NEWS,
Sept. 2, 2001, at HI (reporting that immigrants are willing to work at difficult and
potentially dangerous jobs). Immigrants' willingness to take "unwanted" jobs is
even seen as a positive by some. See Irene Zopoth Hudson & Susan Schenck,
America: Land of Opportunity or Exploitation?, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351,
362-63 (2002) (quoting President George W. Bush criticizing the ICRA for
penalizing employers for hiring people to do jobs others are not willing to do).
However, others assert that the idea that immigrants do not compete with native
workers is a myth. See Steven T. Camarota, Tired & Poor: The Bankrupt Argument
for Mass, Unskilled Immigration, NAT'L REV., Sept. 3, 2001, at 21 (finding there are
over ten million native workers with similar educational background as
undocumented workers competing with immigrants for jobs).
25. See S. Mitra Kalita, Study: Illegal Workers Vital; Immigrants Give Economy a
$300B Lift, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 2001, at A6 (reporting that according to a recent
study illegal immigrants contribute $300 billion dollars to the nation's economy
each year); James D. Hamilton, Jr., The Law and More: Plight of Immigrants is Far
front Fiction, N.J. LAWYER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 7 (finding "immigrants pay
approximately $28 billion per year more in taxes then they consume in services");
Obhof, supra note 23, at 175 (finding 75% of immigrants have income taxes
withheld). But see Camarota, supra note 24, at 21 (estimating the average Mexican
immigrant uses $55,200 more in public services than he or she pays in taxes).
26. See Nancy Cleeland, Off-the-Books Jobs Growing in Region, L.A. TIMES, May
6, 2002, at Cl (stating that in Los Angeles, off-the-books employment costs the
state $1.1 billion in uncollected payroll benefits such as Social Security taxes,
workers compensation insurance, and unemployment insurance).
27. See Cleeland, supra note 20.
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some union members, 28 the animosity appears to have eased over
the past fifteen years. 29 Organized labor is working to unionize
undocumented workers offering that immigrants will benefit from
unionization as a rallying point.30 However, union organizers face
hurdles in organizing immigrants, ranging from fears that
participating in an organizational campaign will result in
deportation 31 to fears that unions will reduce the ability to work.
32
B. PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES
Congress established guidelines for national labor policy with
passage of the National Labor Relation Act in 1935. 33 The NLRA
protects workers' rights to bargain collectively 34 in order to ensure
industrial stability35 by prohibiting certain employer conduct.36
28. See Warren Strugatch, Unions Rethink Links to Undocumented Labor, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at 14LI (indicating that long time union members are not
enthusiastic supporters of unionizing immigrant labor).
29. See Cleeland, supra note 20 (reporting that the AFL-CIO called for amnesty
for millions of undocumented workers and the repeal of laws targeted at making
the hiring of undocumented workers illegal); Meister, supra note 24 (proposing that
the impetus for the change in policy of the AFL-CIO, and unions in general, may
have more to do with declining membership roles than with assisting current union
members, stating "unions, which now represent less than 15 percent of America's
workers, have been driven by a great need to expand").
30. Unions can help employees improve wages and working conditions, provide
job security, and help employees resolve situations with employers. See AFL-CIO,
How and Why People Join Unions, at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutunions/joinunions
(last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
31. Nancy Cleeland, Unionizing is Catch-22 for Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2000, at Al (reporting that among undocumented workers "stories of
retaliatory firings spread quickly, and carry far more weight than the carefully
worded assurances of federal agencies").
32. See Steven Greenhouse, Immigrants in the Middle: Some Workers Want a
Union; Others Fear the Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at BI (reporting that some
immigrant workers at a bakery were hesitant to join a union for fear union rules
would reduce their ability to work large amounts of overtime, resulting in smaller
paychecks).
33. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (2002)).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees the right to self organization, to
participate in labor organizations, and bargain collectively).
35. See id. See also James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining
Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 948 (1996)
(explaining that supporters of the NLRA reasoned that protection of collective
bargaining would "reduce the costly effects of conflict between management and
workers").
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (prohibiting conduct terminating an employee for
participation in a union). See also id. § 158(a)(5) (stating that employers cannot
refuse to bargain with the representative from a recognized union); id. § 158(a)(1)
(stating that employers cannot interfere with employees' section 7 rights); id. § 157
(Section 7 rights include "the right to self-organize, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
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Decisions made under the NLRA are appealable. 37
For violations of the NLRA, employers may face
reinstatement orders, backpay awards, cease and desist orders, 38
court ordered injunctions,39 and other remedies. 40
In addition to the NLRAI undocumented aliens have
traditionally been protected by other federal laws including the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)41 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.42 Under Title VII and the FLSA, illegal immigrants
retained the right to backpay. 43 While Hoffman specifically
addressed backpay under the NLRA, how the decision will
ultimately affect backpay under Title VII and the FLSA cases is
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection").
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (2002).
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any
United States Court of Appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such
person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia....
Id.
38. See id. § 160(c).
39. See id. § 1600) (granting the Board the authority to petition to a district court
for injunctive relief).
40. Other remedies include posting the employer's illegal practices inside
facilities, mandatory contract bargaining with the certified union, and temporary
court injunctions. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 303 (1967)
(posting the employer's illegal practices); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 610 (1969) (mandatory contract bargaining); 29 U.S.C. § 1606) (temporary
court injunctions).
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2002). The major provisions established under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 were a minimum wage, a standard workweek,
the requirement of overtime for hourly employees, and an increase in the minimum
age for employment. See Natalie Slavens Abbott, To Pay or Not to Pay:
Modernizing the Overtime Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 253, 256-58 (1998).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2002) (explaining that
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of color, race, gender, national
origin, or religion).
43. See THE U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws (Oct. 26, 1999), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/undoc.html (listing the EEOC remedies as injunctive
relief, instatement, reinstatement, and backpay). See also Patel v. Quality Inn
South, 846 F.2d 700, 706 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (pre-Immigration Reform and Control Act
case allowing undocumented workers to bring claims for backpay under the FLSA).
But see THE U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, RECESSION OF ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (June 27, 2002) available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/undoc-recind.html (recinding the enforcement guidance of
EEOC remedies available to undocumented workers).
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unclear. 44
C. DEFERENCE TO THE NLRB?
The NLRB has congressional authority to administer the
NLRA. 45 Decisions of the Board are appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals. 46 While the Board is generally given discretion
in its decisions,47 it is subject to limitations.48
The Supreme Court established guidelines for the judicial
review of agency decisions in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National
Resources Defense Council.49 The applicability of the Chevron
doctrine to the NLRB, however, is not clear. 50 Thus, the NLRB is
44. See infra note 220 (discussing recent court decisions applying Hoffman to
Title VII and FLSA cases).
45. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (concluding that
because of the wide scope of the NLRA, Congress left administration to the Board
"subject to limited review"). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2002).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Any person aggrieved by the Board's decision can
appeal to the Court of Appeals in the District where the violation occurred, or in
the District of Columbia. Id. The Board also has the power to petition any court of
appeals of the United States. Id. § 160(e).
47. See id. § 160(c) ("[The Board shall] take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies
of this subchapter.").
48. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46-7 (1942) (holding that while
the NLRA can give the Board "considerable breadth," the Board cannot act "so
single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important
Congressional objectives"); accord NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S.
240 (1939) (reversing the Board's decision to require reemployment for workers
engaged in a violent strike).
49. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (establishing a two step test in Chevron, which requires (1)
asking whether the statute plainly addresses the issue; and if not, (2) whether the
agency interpretation is a "permissible construction" of the statute). See also id. at
864-65 (giving three policy reasons for giving deference to agencies: (1) agency
expertise; (2) agency flexibility; and (3) political accountability); Susan K. Goplen,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal Interpretations After
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WASH. L. REV. 207, 211-212 (1993).
50. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.
J. 833, 838-39 n.23 (2001) (discussing the Court's deference to the NLRB before and
after Chevron). See also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1992)
(showing further evidence of the lower level of deference awarded the NLRB). In
Lechrnere, the Court applied a decision made thirty years before Chevron to limit
the Board's authority to allow labor union access to private property. Id. at 540-41.
See also Goplen, supra note 49, at 223-26 (arguing that relying on stare decisis
undermines the three policy goals of Chevron); Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare
Decisis "Exception" to the Chevron Deference Rule, 44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 762 (1992)
(finding that the Court's use of stare decisis in Lechmere undermined Chevron);
Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts,
43 ALA. L. REV. 35, 63-65 (1991) (discussing the problems courts face when two
agencies reasonably interpret the interrelationship between different statutes of
each agency).
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left in a state of limbo. The issue of administrative deference is
further muddied by the interrelation between labor policy, which
the Board can effect, and immigration policy, which is out of the
Board's jurisdiction. 51
D. IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE U.S. PRIOR TO
HOFFMAN
The state of immigration law in respect to awarding illegal
aliens backpay changed dramatically in the 1980s. Prior to the
enactment of the IRCA in 1986, the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)52 dictated immigration law and policy.5 3 The INA was
primarily concerned with legal admission and treatment of legal
immigrants to the United States, not the treatment of
undocumented workers.5 4 The INA was initially passed without
provisions applying to employers. 55 The IRCA was culminated
from a decade-long analysis of the impact of illegal immigration. 56
Congress designed the IRCA to "close the back door on illegal
immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may
remain open."57 The primary target of the IRCA was employers,
51. Generally, agency interpretations of another agency's empowering statute are
not entitled to any judicial deference. See New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v. Fed.
Mar. Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (questioning the Federal
Maritime Commission's ability to interpret labor law stating "[w]hen an agency
interprets a statute other than that which it has been entrusted to administer, its
interpretation is not entitled to deference") (citing Dep't of the Treasury v. Fed.
Labor Relations Auth., 837 F.2d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). See also California
Nat'l Guard v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 697 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding judicial deference is not required for the Federal Labor Relation
Authority's interpretation of the National Guard Technicians Act); Susan H. Welin,
The Effect of Employer Sanctions on Employment Discrimination and Illegal
Immigration, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 249, 251 (1989) (explaining that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service has authority over immigration). The INS
was formerly part of the Department of Justice, but is now under the unbrella of
the Department of Homeland Security. See
http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/homeland.htm.
52. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002).
53. See Welin, supra note 51, at 250 (identifying the INA as "the principal
legislation setting out the current system of immigration in the United States").
54. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976) (holding that the INA showed
"at best evidence of a peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants").
55. See Welin, supra note 51, at 253-54 (explaining that an amendment allowing
for sanctions against employers was turned down during the creation of the INA).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 51-56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5655-60 (detailing the Congressional immigration initiatives from the early
1970s to the early 1980s). See also Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, §§ 101-103 (1986) (because the IRCA, not the
INA, addresses the employment of undocumented workers, it is the primary
immigration law discussed in this article).
57. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
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not undocumented workers. 58  Congressional modifications to
existing immigration law included changing how workers were
hired and the penalties paid by employers. 59
The other major factor in changing immigration law relating
to backpay was the Supreme Court's decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB.6° Sure-Tan involved illegal workers who were reported to
the INS by their employer in retaliation for voting in favor of
union representation. 6 1 The Court was presented with a Board
order subsequently modified by the Seventh Circuit.62 While
recognizing coverage of illegal workers by federal labor laws, 63 the
Court rejected backpay based on a cryptic "unavailable for work"
5649-50.
58. See id. (providing that the Act's focus on the employer addresses the
ineffectiveness of focusing sanctions and penalties on illegal immigrants stating
"[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally"). Employment in
the United States is not the only factor impacting the decision of whether or not to
immigrate. See Welin, supra note 51, at 263 (identifying "push factors" such as
political unrest, unemployment, repressive governments, and high population
growth rates as reasons to immigrate to the United States). Combining "push
factors" with "pull factors" such as jobs, improved financial situation, and
government programs gives immigrants reasons for wanting to immigrate. Id. A
less sophisticated way to analyze the ineffectiveness of removing federal
protections from undocumented workers is to realize immigrants are not likely to
know about the Fair Labor Standard Act and NLRA sanctions. See also Patel v.
Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (doubting "many illegal
aliens come to this county to gain the protections of our labor laws").
59. See Welin, supra note 51, at 256-57. Under the IRCA employers must verify
the work eligibility of every employee and face up to $10,000 in civil penalties for
each undocumented worker hired and up to six months imprisonment for a pattern
of knowingly employing undocumented workers. Id. See also generally
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
60. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
61. See id. at 887-88. The manager was aware of the employees' illegal status
prior to the Union election and personally sent a letter to the INS asking the
agency to check into the immigrants' naturalization status. Id. at 888.
Approximately one month later the workers voluntarily returned to Mexico as a
substitute for deportation. Id. Because the employer reported the undocumented
employees to the INS in retaliation for supporting unionization, the Board found
the employer in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Id. at 887-88.
62. The Board awarded the employees reinstatement with backpay and issued its
order after the NLRB's General Council suggested that ordering backpay and
reinstatement could be illegal. Id. at 889, 890 n.3. The Court of Appeals, in its
opinion, allowed the employees the option of reinstatement for up to four years and
awarded an artificial "minimum award" of six months backpay. Id. The option of
restatement was contingent on the worker's legal presence in the United States.
NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 606 (7th Cir. 1982). The "minimum award"
represented the amount of wages based on a fictional amount of time the court
determined the employees would have remained employed without being detained
by the INS. Id.
63. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (requiring deference where the Board has
consistently found undocumented workers as employees covered by the NLRA).
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standard.64 Despite its ruling, the Sure-Tan Court indicated its
support for application of the NLRA to undocumented workers. 65
The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, criticized the Court for
not deferring to the Board66 and for undermining immigration
policy by limiting available remedies. 67
With the IRCA6S and Sure-Tan as guides, the lower courts'
and the Board's attempt to apply a uniform standard failed. The
circuit courts since Sure-Tan have reached an almost opposite
conclusions regarding an undocumented worker's ability to receive
backpay. The three primary cases highlighting the conflict are
Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB,69 Del Rey
Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB,70 NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers
Group, Inc.71
Local 512 involved a pre-IRCA application of Sure-Tan.72
64. See id. at 902-03. Because the workers were in Mexico, the Court denied
awarding backpay, holding that such an award requires legal admittance to the
United States. Id. "[Elmployees must be deemed 'unavailable' for work ... during
any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the
United States." Id. While the text of the opinion seemed to clearly define the
"unavailable for work standard," the context of Sure-Tan complicated the situation.
Id. at 887. The workers in Sure-Tan voluntarily left for and were presumably still
in Mexico. Id. Lower courts since Sure-Tan have disagreed whether the
"unavailable" standard prohibited backpay to all undocumented workers before
deportation or only when the undocumented workers are already back in their
native country. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text (discussing several
lower courts' interpretations of the "unavailable standard").
65. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892-93 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360
(1976), which held that the employment of undocumented workers was at best a
"peripheral concern" of the INA and therefore, the NLRA was not in conflict with
the INA). Furthermore, the Court noted that the application of labor standards to
illegal immigrants puts them on equal footing with legal workers by reducing the
undocumented workers' attractiveness to employers. Id. at 893.
66. See id. at 908 (Brennan, J., concurred in part and dissented in part).
67. See id. at 912 (Brennan, J., concurred in part and dissented in part) ("Once
employers, such as petitioners, realize that they may violate the NLRA with
respect to their undocumented alien employees without fear of having to
recompense those workers for lost backpay, their 'incentive to hire such illegal
aliens' will not decline, it will increase.").
68. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
69. 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that undocumented workers were
entitled to backpay under the NLRA).
70. 976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding Sure-Tan prohibited awarding
backpay).
71. 134 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding Sure-Tan did not unilaterally exclude
illegal aliens from receiving backpay).
72. In Local 512, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found a wire and tubular
display manufacturer in California in violation of §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the
NLRA for actions against certain employees. Local 512, 795 F.2d at 709. Following
Sure-Tan, the Board refused to enforce the AUfs order of backpay and the union
representing the workers petitioned for review of the Board's order. Id. at 710.
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The Ninth Circuit held that undocumented immigrants were
entitled to protection under the NLRA73 and that denying backpay
was inconsistent with the NLRA.7 4
Del Rey Tortilleria dealt with a situation where the NLRB
charged the employer with an unfair labor practice for firing two
employees exercising their union rights.75 While not admitting an
unfair labor practice, the employer agreed, contingent upon a
formal hearing, to reinstate the two employees and award them
backpay. 76 At the hearing, the employer contested reinstatement
on the grounds that the two employees were undocumented
workers. 77 The ALJ, in a decision upheld by the Board, awarded
reinstatement and backpay. 78 The Seventh Circuit rejected the
Board's backpay holding,7 9 finding that awarding backpay would
undermine Sure-Tan80 and Congressional intent.8 '
A.P.R.A. involved an employer who knowingly hired
undocumented aliens, coerced the employees to sign affidavits
stating that they did not support the union, and eventually fired
the workers in violation of the NLRA.82 The Second Circuit held
73. Id. at 719 (commenting that "the Board's proposed remedy encourages
employers to continue to violate the NLRA").
74. Id. at 719-20 (stating that awarding backpay promotes the goals of the NLRA
and does not undermine the INA).
75. See John F. Barmon, The Seventh Circuit Explains Why There Is No Harm in
Exploiting Undocumented Workers: Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d
1115 (7th Cir. 1992), 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 567, 568-69 (1993).
76. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1117 (7th Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 1117 (explaining that during the hearing the parties stipulated that the
employees were undocumented workers during their time of employment).
78. Id. The ALJ relied primarily upon Local 512, to conclude that Sure-Tan
applied only to undocumented workers no longer in the United States. Id.
79. Id. at 1121.
80. Id. The Court interpreted the "unavailable for work" doctrine to include
illegal aliens residing inside and outside of the United States. Id.
81. Id. (holding the "IRCA reinforced the policy of the INA to preserve
employment for American workers"). The Board argued that the IRCA gave it
broad discretion in decisions regarding reinstatement and backpay. Id. The Court
rejected the Board's decision holding that Congress endorsed an interpretation of
Sure-Tan that barred all illegal immigrants from receiving backpay. Id.
Furthermore, in dicta, the Court declared that the IRCA "makes it unlawful for an
employer to hire an undocumented alien; and thus, clearly bars the Board from
awarding backpay to undocumented aliens wrongfully discharged after the IRCA's
enactment." Id. at 1122. However, as the next two cases show, perhaps the issue
was not as clear as the Seventh Circuit thought. See, e.g., NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel
Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 1997); Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
82. A.P.R.A., 134 F.3d at 52-53. In A.P.R.A., the employer hired two employees
knowing they were in the country illegally and subsequently fired them when they
participated in a union organizing drive. Id. at 52. The Board found the company
fired two employees for ongoing union activity and therefore violated § 8(a)(3) of the
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that backpay in this situation promoted the policy goals of the
NLRA and the IRCA, reduced employer incentives to hire
undocumented aliens, and prevented frustration of national labor
policy.8 3 Furthermore, the Second Circuit, focusing its attention
on the employer, held that the awarding of backpay does not
require the employer to violate the IRCA.84 Instead, the backpay
compensates the employees for the economic injuries suffered as a
result of the employer's unlawful discrimination. 85
Courts are not the only entity experiencing confusion.8 6 With
the courts and the NLRB, the main enforcer of labor policy, in
disagreement, the stage was set for the Supreme Court to
determine the meaning of the IRCA and to determine whether
Sure-Tan was still relevant.
In 2002, with ambiguous precedent, differing circuit court
interpretations, and questions of administrative deference, the
Supreme Court decided Hoffman.
II. HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS v. NLRB
In May of 1988, Hoffman hired Jos6 Castro to work in its
production facility.87 As required by federal law under the IRCA,
the employer verified documents presented by Castro indicating
his ability to legally work in the United States.8 8 In late 1988,
Castro became involved in a union organizing campaign at the
Hoffman facility by the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and
NLRA. Id. at 53. The employer knew the employees were illegal and the Board
ordered the employer to pay backpay and reinstate the workers. Id.
83. Id. at 57-58.
84. Id. at 58 (commenting how "nothing in the Board's order requires the
company or the employers to violate the IRCA").
85. Id.
86. The NLRB initially interpreted the IRCA as restricting its ability to award
backpay. See Memorandum GC 87-8 from the Office of General Counsel, NLRB, to
all NLRB Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers, The Impact
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 on Board Remedies for
Undocumented Discriminatees (Oct. 27, 1987), available at 1987 WL 109409
(establishing as Board policy not to seek backpay for undocumented workers that
do not apply for temporary resident status). The Board switched it position over
ten years later allowing backpay to undocumented workers wrongfully dismissed
by an employer. See Memorandum GC 98-15 from Office of General Counsel,
NLRB, to all NLRB Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers,
Reinstatement of Backpay Remedies for Discriminatees Who May Be
Undocumented Aliens In Light of Recent Board and Court Precedent (Dec. 4, 1998),
available at 1998 WL 1806350.
87. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 8.
88. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994)
(providing that Castro presented documents belonging to a person born in El Paso,
Texas).
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Plastic Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO.89 In January of
1989, because of their union organizing activities, Hoffman laid off
Castro and other employees. 90 This action was later found to be a
violation of § 8(a)(1)9 1 and § 8(a)(3)9 2 of the NLRA.9 3 In accordance
with the Board-ordered remedies, Hoffman reinstated the affected
employees and offered each backpay.94  At the hearing to
determine backpay, Castro revealed he was in the United States
illegally and obtained his job at Hoffman by offering the birth
certificate of another.95 Using provisions in the IRCA and the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Sure-Tan, the ALJ denied the
remedies of backpay and reinstatement. 96 The Board reversed the
ALJ's decision and granted Castro backpay from the time of his
termination by Hoffman up to the time his illegal status was
discovered by Hoffman.97 As permitted by the NLRA,98 Hoffman
petitioned for review to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
where both a panel9 9 and the court en banc'00 denied Hoffman's
petition and enforced the order of the Board in favor of Castro. 10 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari at Hoffman's
request.102  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rhenquist
reversed the Court of Appeals and the Board holding that the
Board lacked the authority to proscribe remedies in what is
89. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
90. The Board found that Hoffman selectively laid off four employees: Mauricio
Mejia, Casimiro Arauz, Moises Gonzalez, and Jos6 Castro. Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. at 684.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2002).
92. Id. at § 158(a)(3).
93. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 100 (1992) (finding
violations of § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA). Rights granted by the NLRA are
granted to employees and not limited solely to union members. 29 U.S.C. § 157
(2002). Because of the broad language, the Board extends protection to union
employees, employees in the process of organizing, and employees not interested in
unionizing. Id.
94. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140-41. The Board also ordered Hoffman to cease and
desist from interrogating its employees, laying off employees because they support
unions, and interfering with employees' rights under § 7 of the NLRA. Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. at 107.
95. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. at 685.
96. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141-42.
97. Id. ([Tihe most effective way to accommodate and further immigration
policies embodied in [the IRCAI is to provide the protections and remedies of the
(NLRA] to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees.")
(quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998)).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2002).
99. 208 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
100. 237 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
101. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 142.
102. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
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primarily an immigration issue, that awarding backpay is
explicitly counter to the purpose of national immigration policy
under the IRCA, and that awarding backpay condones illegal
behavior. 103
The Court began its 5-4 decision by establishing the extent
and limitations of the Board's authority. 0 4 The Court highlighted
the Board's inability to award backpay when the employee
commits an illegal act, 10 5 and emphasized that the Court has
conditionally limited the Board to the constraints of the NLRA.106
The Court used two cases, Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB107 and
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.108 to highlight limitations on
the Board's authority. 10 9  In Southern S.S., an employer
discharged crewmembers that participated in a strike aboard a
docked ship." 0 Due to the fact that the workers were expressing
their labor rights, the Board ordered for their reinstatement and
backpay. 111 The Court reversed the Board's order of backpay,
holding that the strike was in violation of federal mutiny statutes
and therefore, federal law prohibited the employees' conduct. 112
The Court emphasized that Congressional intent contained in one
statute cannot be used to interpret a separate statute.1 13
In Fansteel, employees unlawfully seized and occupied their
employer's building while engaging in a sit-down strike. 1 4 After a
day the sheriff forcefully removed the employees for violating a
103. Id. at 151-52.
104. Id. at 144. The Court has held federal courts have the ability to decide labor
law issues that "emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent
federal remedies .... " Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975). In Connell, the Court held the NLRA did
not protect a labor agreement from federal anti-trust laws. Id. at 635. The Court
further limited the NLRA in NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)
(precluding a Board order in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code).
105. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 143 ("Since the Board's inception, we have
consistently set aside awards of reinstatement or backpay to employees found
guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment.").
106. Id. at 144 ("[We have accordingly never deferred to the Board's remedial
preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and
policies unrelated to the NLRA.").
107. 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
108. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
109. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
110. 316 U.S. at 34.
111. Id. at 36.
112. Id. at 48 ("We cannot ignore that the strike was unlawful from its very
inception.").
113. Id. at 47 (emphasizing that "the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls
for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another").
114. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 248 (1939).
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court order to end the strike and surrender the premises. 115 The
employer fined many who participated in the strike.116 The Board
ordered the employer to reinstate the employees with backpay. 117
In Fansteel, the Court reversed the Board's order holding that
illegal and violent behavior was counter to Congressional
objectives of the NLRA and therefore the employees' conduct was
not protected under the NLRA. 118
The Court compared Hoffman to Southern S.S. and
Fansteel."19  These examples of the Board's limitation were
compared to its decision in ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB. 12°
In ABF Freight, an employee who falsely testified at a compliance
hearing was nonetheless awarded backpay. 121  The Court
distinguished the employee's behavior in ABF with Castro's
stating: (1) the conduct of the ABF employee was not serious
misconduct; (2) ABF did not involve a Board interpretation of
other areas of law; and (3) the employee's conduct in ABF, while
illegal, did not cause the "underlying employment relationship" to
be illegal. 122
Ignoring a large portion of both the petitioner's and
respondent's briefs, 123 the Court largely disregarded Sure-Tan.12 4
Instead, the Court focused on the current state of immigration
law. 25 The Court indicated that the purpose of the IRCA was to
"forcefully" combat the employment of illegal aliens, 26 imposing
duties on employers in the hiring process and imposing penalties
on employees that violate the IRCA.12 7 Treating the burden of the
employers and the employees as equal, the Court found awarding
115. Id. at 249.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 250-51.
118. Id. at 257-58 ("It is [not] any part of the policies of the [NLRA] to encourage
employees to resort to force and violence in defiance of the law of the land.").
119. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143, 147 (2002).
120. 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
121. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 145-46 (explaining that in ABF Freight, the employee
testified falsely under oath).
122. Id. at 145-46.
123. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 7-20; Brief for the Respondent,
supra note 9, at 16-29.
124. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147 (summarizing the appellant's and respondent's
interpretations of Sure-Tan, the court stated it "need not resolve the controversy").
125. Id. (assessing that "[wihether isolated sentences from Sure-Tan definitively
control ... we think the question presented here is better analyzed through a wider
lens, focused as it must be on a legal landscape now significantly changed").
126. Id. (citing INS v. National Center for Imnnzigrants'Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183,
194 n.8 (1991)).
127. Id. at 147-48.
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Castro backpay ran counter to the IRCA's underlying policies. 128
The Court claimed that the "significant sanctions" imposed
by the Board, such as a cease and desist order and posted notice to
employees informing them of their rights and Hoffman's
infractions, imposed a serious penalty upon Hoffman and
prevented Hoffman from getting away with a violation of the
NLRA.129 The Court was also quick to point out the inability of an
employee to "obtain employment in the United States without
some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies."'130
The Court rejected the Board's theory that Congress never
specifically limited backpay as a remedy for illegal aliens and that
allowing backpay is consistent with the IRCA and national
immigration policy. 131 To the contrary, added the Court, awarding
backpay "condone[s] prior violations of the immigration laws, and
encourages future violations."'3 2
The dissent, written by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, viewed the issue from the vantage
point of the impact of the backpay award on both immigration
policy and labor policy. 33 Stressing the importance of backpay as
one of the only "weapons in [the NLRB's] remedial arsenal,"'134
Breyer noted that removing that weapon would allow employers to
"violate the labor laws ... with impunity."1 35  Coming to the
opposite conclusion of the majority, Breyer concluded that
removing backpay would actually increase the amount of illegal
immigration by removing the deterrents, thus, giving employers
incentives to actively locate and hire illegal immigrants. 136 Breyer
further argued that the extension of labor law to immigrants
includes backpay.' 37 Breyer distinguished the illegal behavior of
Castro from the employees in Fansteel and Southern S.S. in that
128. Id. at 148 (stating that when an employee tenders false documents he or she
"subverts the cornerstone of the IRCA's enforcement mechanism").
129. Id. at 152.
130. Id. at 148.
131. Id. at 149. The Board claimed the IRCA is primarily aimed at deterring
employers from hiring illegal aliens rather than focusing on deterring aliens from
seeking employment. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 20. Because of the
importance of backpay to deterring rouge employers, the Board has the choice to
ignore Castro's illegal use of documents. Id. at 22.
132. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150.
133. See id. at 153-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 154.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id. at 155.
137. Id.
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those employees were fired for good cause, while Castro was not. 138
Lastly, considering the circumstances, Breyer found that the
Board's decision was reasonable. 39
III. CRITICIZING THE COURT
A. The Flawed Legal Analysis of Five Supreme Court
Justices
The primary thrust of the Supreme Court's analysis is
relatively straightforward - illegal activities disqualify an
employee from NLRA protection. 140 However, the cases relied
upon by the court, Southern S.S. and Fansteel, are distinguished
by the nature and circumstances of the employees' conduct.14 1 In
Southern S.S., the employees were fired for their strike,
interpreted as a mutiny.142 In Fansteel, the employees were fired
for violent behavior resulting from seizing the employer's
buildings. 143 Both activities were found in violation of the law,
therefore, the employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by
firing the employee. 44 Hoffman fired Castro for union activity, not
for his illegal immigration status. 145  In previous cases, the
employees were held responsible by the employer for their own
actions. 46 Following Hoffman, employees face the consequences
138. Id. at 158-59.
139. Id. at 161 (stating Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) requires courts to uphold reasonable agency
positions).
140. See supra notes 103-132 and accompanying text.
141. See Southern S.S. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
142. Southern S.S., 316 U.S. at 40 (holding a strike aboard a docked ship was in
violation of mutiny statutes of the criminal code).
143. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 257-58 (1939) (holding that the protections of the
NLRA do not extend to workers engaged in violent activity).
144. See id. at 254 ("As respondent's unfair labor practices afforded no excuse for
the seizure and holding of its buildings, respondent had its normal rights of
redress. Those rights, in their most obvious scope, included the right to discharge
the wrongdoers from its employ.").
145. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
Hoffman was not even aware of Castro's status until the hearing to determine
backpay. Id. Had Castro not been fired for his union activity, he likely would have
continued employment at Hoffman. Id. This statement is grounded in the fact
Hoffman was unaware of Castro's illegal status for over four years after firing him.
Id. at 141 (stating that Castro was fired in 1989 and his illegal status wasn't
discovered until the backpay compliance hearing in 1993). Castro also
demonstrated his desire and willingness to work by finding employment after
termination by Hoffman. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 24.
146. See supra notes 141-144.
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for the illegal actions of their employers.
Furthermore, in relying on Fansteel and Southern S.S., the
Court failed to adequately distinguish ABF Freight.147 Under ABF
Freight, the Board has the discretion to decide if illegal activity by
employees precludes protection under the NLRA.148 Similar to the
claim of perjury in ABF Freight, Castro's violation of the IRCA was
unrelated to the violation of the NLRA.149 If Hoffman had fired
Castro because he illegally obtained employment in violation of
the IRCA, then Castro's situation would be analogous to those in
Southern S.S. and Fansteel. However, because termination of
workers for union activity is in direct violation of the NLRA,15°
Castro's situation is similar to that of the employee in ABF
Freight. Like Castro, the ABF Freight employee violated the
law1 5' but was still eligible for backpay. 1' 5  The Board was
following the Court's decision in ABF Freight and therefore the
Board's decision should be respected.
The Court validated its decision by noting the employer,
Hoffman, faces other sanctions. 5 3 With respect to Castro, the
Court argued that awarding backpay absolves Castro of any
wrongdoing and actually assists him in his illegal activities. 154
Ironically, the Court, while analyzing the labor dispute through
the lens of immigration law, ignored immigration law in analyzing
Castro's conduct.' 55 Under immigration law, as mentioned by the
Court,156  the employee faces the prospect of criminal
prosecution. 157 Undocumented workers also face the prospect of
deportation 58 Punishment under immigration law, rather than
147. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 325 (1994) (holding that
the Board's decision to allow reinstatement and backpay to an employee who gave
false testimony before an AU.I during a proceeding to determine if the employer
committed an unfair labor practice is reasonable).
148. Id. at 324 (holding since Congress delegated authority to the Board, its
views "merit the greatest deference").
149. See generally Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2002).
151. ABF Freight Systems Inc., 510 U.S. at 326-29 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(detailing the false testimony made by the employee while under oath).
152. Id. at 321.
153. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152 (providing the Board has already imposed
significant sanctions against Hoffman, including a cease and desist order and
posting notice of employees NLRA rights).
154. Id. at 150.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 148.
157. The criminal code allows fines and up to five years in prison for producing
false documents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2002).
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2002) (allowing for the deportation of inadmissible
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labor law, is the most reasonable in this situation.15 9 Denying
backpay adds an unnecessary additional punishment and removes
a right granted by the NLRA while simultaneously benefiting the
wrongdoing employer.160 Punishing illegal employees under
immigration laws, while also providing backpay, upholds the
intent of the IRCA161 and the NLRA.162 Clearly, the best
punishment in this situation is to uphold the two separate, but
closely related, federal policies.-
Under the NLRA, employees generally have a duty to
mitigate damages by seeking other employment. 163 The Court
uses this as further evidence that Castro, under immigration laws,
cannot receive backpay since illegal immigrants are unable to
mitigate damages. 64 However, the Court ignores that Castro
indeed had mitigated damages by finding new work. 165 The
purpose of mitigation is not to protect the employer from paying
backpay, but rather to prevent employees from taking advantage
of backpay and receiving a windfall. 166 Immigrants generally do
aliens). Aliens who are in the United States without permission are inadmissible.
8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2002).
159. I would like to stress that punishment under immigration law, i.e.,
deportation, is warranted in this situation, but not in others. Castro's situation,
where his immigration status was discovered at a judicial hearing, is
distinguishable from situations where employers intentionally call the INS to
deport employees. See Illegal Immigrants Help Unionize a Hotel but Face
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at A24 (reporting on a settlement reached,
after a hotel reported its workers to the INS, who were involved in a unionizing
campaign). See also THE AWFUL TRUTH (Docurama 2002) (a short documentary
detailing one outraged citizen's response to the firings, and tips on how to make life
miserable for a hotel manager). Deportation initiated by employers is clearly
unfair to the immigrant and should not result in automatic deportation. See
generally Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy
of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 371-
380 (2001) (criticizing the INS for allowing employer derived evidence in
deportation hearings).
160. Under the Hoffman enforcement scheme, employers can illegally fire
undocumented employees and employers will face only weak NLRB sanctions and
virtually non-existent INS sanctions. See generally Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
161. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 46 (1986), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650
("Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from hiring
unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally or
violating their status in search of employment.").
162. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2002) (protecting an employee's right to organize).
163. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941).
164. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151 (stating Castro could not mitigate damages
"without triggering new the IRCA violations, either by tendering false documents
to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore the IRCA and hire illegal
workers").
165. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 41 (indicating Castro found
employment as a carpenter's helper and a gardener after termination by Hoffman).
166. See Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 198 (holding the Board has the authority to
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not concern themselves with the inner-workings of the NLRA and,
generally, will not consider the ability to receive backpay when
deciding to immigrate to the United States. 167 Thus, awarding
backpay when undocumented workers seek other employment,
upholds the spirit of the NLRA and does not weaken immigration
policy.
The Court also felt awarding backpay would condone
immigration violations. 168 In a theoretical sense this proposition
might have some truth, but in practical terms awarding backpay
does not support violations. It is relatively neutral in this respect.
Immigrants simply want a job.' 69 Whether or not the Board can
award backpay is irrelevant to this underlying motive.'
70
B. The NLRB has Authority to Grant Backpay to Illegally
Terminated Employees Taking Into Account Immigration
Policy
The Court errs in viewing the firing of undocumented
workers for union organizing as only an immigration issue and not
taking into account other areas of law. One of the primary reasons
for immigration to the United States is the availability of higher
paying jobs and through those wages a better life. 171  Also,
immigrants are quickly filling union ranks, especially in the
unskilled labor sector.' 72  The two preceding phenomenon
highlight the importance that employment and labor policy plays
in this situation. Analysis solely from an immigration law
perspective does not adequately address this labor issue. Indeed,
when passed, Congress specifically limited the scope of the IRCA
and its impact on existing labor law.' 73
make workers whole for "actual losses").
167. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704-05 (11th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the motivations of undocumented workers).
168. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137 (allowing backpay to illegal immigrants would
"encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities,
condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations").
169. See Patel, 846 F.2d at 704 (explaining "it is the hope of getting a job - at any
wage - that prompts most illegal aliens to cross our borders").
170. Because immigrants already face deportation back to their home country, it
is unlikely that not receiving backpay for unfair labor practices by an employer is
at the forefront of an immigrant's mind. Id. (doubting "many illegal aliens come to
this country to gain the protection of our labor laws").
171. See Welin, supra note 51, at 263 (identifying jobs and improved financial
situation as primary factors drawing immigrants to the United States).
172. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing labor's campaign to
organize illegal immigrants); Meister, supra note 24 (reporting illegal immigrants
often get jobs bearing titles such as janitor or child care worker).
173. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
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In Hoffman, the Court established a myopic principle that
limits the Board's ability to interpret immigration laws where the
immigration statute falls outside the NLRA.174 Laws should not
be interpreted in a vacuum and must take into account practical
application. Labor law is affected by other laws and agency
interpretations. A bright-line rule stating that the NLRB is
unable to reasonably interpret a statute affecting undocumented
workers fails to promote either immigration or labor policy. The
efficacy of the Court's rule is further diminished when one
considers that the United States government, the enforcer of
immigration law, supports the NLRB's position. 175 Immigration
policy is not benefited by the Court's interpretation in Hoffman
and labor policy is clearly hurt by it. 76 The proper approach is to
analyze the purpose behind the two policies and decide on the
policy most beneficial to both areas of labor and immigration. If
the Court is truly trying to limit immigration into this country, a
two-pronged deterrent approach of increasing workers rights and
enforcing tougher sanctions on employers is more logical than
giving employers incentives to hire illegal workers. 177 Increasing
sanctions of employers will give them an incentive to ensure the
status of their employees and the attractiveness of undocumented
workers will be reduced.
Under Chevron, the Board had authority to decide this
matter. 7 8 As previously discussed, this was a labor issue. The
Board made a reasonable decision under the circumstances and,
5662.
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanction
provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor
protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor
relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy
unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for
exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities
protected by existing law. In particular, the employer sanctions provisions
are not intened [sic] to limit in any way the scope of the term "employee" in
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, or of
the rights and protections stated in Sections 7 and 8 of that Act.
Id.
174. NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 1997).
175. See id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Attorney General, the
head of the department containing the INS, supported the Board's position in
Hoffman).
176. See infra notes 199-03.
177. This approach focuses on the employers, not the employees. See supra note
58 and accompanying text (discussing the original intent of the IRCA).
178. The extent of Chevron's application is disputed. See supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
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therefore, deserved administrative deference. 179 The first step in
analyzing the action of an agency is whether Congress has spoken
clearly on the issue at question. 8 0 Congress' ambiguity is evident
by looking at the Supreme Court's interpretation in Sure-Tan and
the subsequent interpretations by circuit courts.18 1 After
ambiguity has been found, the next step is to ask whether the
Board's decision is reasonable. 18 2  In Hoffman, it is entirely
reasonable for the Board to award backpay to an employee
wrongfully fired by an employer.18 3
Castro's situation is made more complicated since the Board
is not interpreting another agency's decision, but is utilizing a
statute other than the NLRA.184 The Board has two separate
reasons for claiming jurisdiction in this situation. First, the IRCA
was not designed to limit the protections of the NLRA or other
existing labor laws.18 5 Second, sanctioning the employer does not
violate the congressional intent of the IRCA.186 In both scenarios
the Board is not interpreting another agency's statute, but rather
is fulfilling congressional intent by interpreting labor law and
establishing labor policy. 8 7
By ignoring the decision of the Board, the Court undermined
the Board's authority and diminished the spirit of the statute. In
Sure-Tan, the Court explicitly held that the NLRA covered
179. See A.P.R.A., 134 F.3d at 50; Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union
v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 720 (9th Cir. 1986) (previous circuit court decisions
supporting awarding backpay to undocumented workers); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding deference is due to an
administrative agency when the statute is ambiguous and the agency's
interpretation is reasonable).
180. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
181. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that
"in computing backpay, employees must be deemed 'unavailable' for work" during
any period). The circuit courts and the Board have struggled to divine the meaning
of "unavailable." See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
182. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
183. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) ("Making the
workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of
the vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces.").
184. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998)
("[Tlhe most effective way to accommodate and further the immigration policies
embodied [in the IRCA is to provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] to
undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees.").
185. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5662.
186. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of the
IRCA).
187. See cases cited supra note 51 (discussing agency limitation of interpreting
statutes).
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immigrants. 8 8 Therefore, the Hoffman decision was within the
authority of the Board. However, the Court somehow
distinguishes the ability to be covered under the NLRA from the
ability to receive backpay. s89 In the wake of Hoffman, individual
undocumented workers are no longer protected under the NLRA.
C. The Court's Decision Ignores Congressional Intent
Behind the IRCA
The majority and dissent came to opposite interpretations of
the intent underlying passage of the IRCA.190 Logically and
practically, the dissent's interpretation upholds the intent of the
IRCA. 191 By denying protection to illegal immigrants under the
NLRA, the Court will increase their attractiveness to employers
92
and put legal workers at a disadvantage. 193  Protecting
undocumented workers under the NLRA is necessary because
deterring illegal immigration is difficult and unrealistic.
194
Furthermore, employers will have an incentive to look for illegal
immigrants since they are easily terminated and the employer is
unlikely to face sanction under other federal laws.195
188. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining
"[undocumented workers] plainly come within the broad statutory definition of
'employee'").
189. "Our first holding in Sure-Tan is not at issue here and does not bear at all on
the scope of Board remedies with respect to undocumented workers." Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149-50 n.4 (2002).
190. The majority found awarding backpay to illegal immigrants "would unduly
trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy."
Id. at 151. The dissent found the Board's decision "reasonably helps to deter
unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent." Id.
at 153.
191. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
intent of the IRCA).
192. See David G. Savage & Nancy Cleeland, High Court Ruling Hurts Union
Goals ofImmigrants, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A20 (quoting a California Labor
Department Official saying the decision in Hoffman "tends to encourage the most
unscrupulous employers to only hire undocumented workers and then fire them
when they try to assert their rights").
193. See Meister, supra note 24.
194. People immigrate for numerous and varied reasons depending on their
individual situations in their native countries. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text (detailing "push" and "pull" factors of immigration and naming
employment as a primary reason). The majority failed to recognize that being
punished by not allowing backpay is, at best, minor in comparison to the
punishment every undocumented worker faces ... deportation. See Patel v. Quality
Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988).
195. See infra Part III.D.
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D. The Court's Decision Derogated the Board's Ability to
Enforce the Internet of the NLRA
The Court pointed out that the Board cannot levy punitive
sanctions on employers, but with its decision, the Court removed
the remedial power of the Board. 196 As the number of illegal
immigrants constitute an increasing number of unionized
workers, 197 their impact on the U.S. economy also increases.198
The Board's lack of power clearly hinders its future ability to
ensure industrial stability.
The divide Hoffman created between immigrants and legal
workers undermines the NLRA by creating division within the
workplace. 199 The action of an employer who willingly fires an
employee will psychologically affect the remaining employees,
illegal or not.200 This dampening effect on bargaining undermines
the intent of the NLRA by reducing the likelihood of negotiation. 201
The Court's reliance on other forms of sanction is misguided.
Hoffman will only weaken already weak enforcement provisions. 20 2
196. After Hoffman, the NLRA is powerless with respect to undocumented
workers. Future employees, illegal immigrants, and legal employees alike are
"protected" solely by cease and desist orders and notices. See Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). But cease and desist orders
scolding the employer to refrain from illegal activity is of little comfort to the
powerless fired immigrant.
197. See Margot Roosevelt, Illegal But Fighting For Rights, TIME, Jan. 22, 2001,
at 68, 68 (reporting immigrants are a "rich new source of constituents" for unions).
198. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing the impact illegal
aliens have on the economy).
199. Collective bargaining by its very nature depends on the ability of workers to
come together. NLRA rules require certain percentages for union certification and
elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2002). By creating a class of workers who will not join in
an organizing campaign, Hoffman destroys any ability for collective activity among
workers and establishes a barrier for employees who want to organize. For
example, if a workplace had ten employees, three of which are illegal, and therefore
very unlikely to vote or organize, organizing employees would need to get six of the
seven "eligible" employees to vote for a union.
200. Labor law is sensitive to the ultimate impact of employer actions on
employees. Often the intent of the employer is less important than the action's
impact on employees. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948)
(allowing for reelections where an employer's conduct prevented a fair election
despite the fact the employers conduct may not constitute an Unfair Labor Practice
as enunciated in the NLRA).
201. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)
(commenting that "[olne of the primary purposes of the Act is to promote the
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management
controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation"). See also 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (2002) (requiring that employers and employees bargain
collectively).
202. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1788-89 (1983) (explaining
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The backpay provision itself is questionable in its effectiveness in
convincing employers not to discharge workers for union activity
in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.203 However, it is the only
monetary sanction left against an employer who illegally fires an
undocumented worker 20 4 and, therefore, this sanction is still
important. 205  Non-monetary sanctions, such as cease-and-desist
orders, are rarely effective. 20 6
Supporters of the Court's decision will state that employees'
rights are not limited to the NLRA.20 7 Other federal laws such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title VII also protect
illegal immigrants. 20 8 However, inclusion under the FLSA and
Title VII stems more from the need to protect workers than from
deterring employers from hiring undocumented workers. 20 9 While
these outlets indirectly give some protection to undocumented
workers, they do not protect the goal of the NLRA to promote
"the traditional remedies for discriminatory discharge - backpay and reinstatement
- simply are not effective deterrents to employers who are tempted to trample on
their employees' rights") (citation omitted). Weiler posits that while the language
of the NLRA suggests that action by the Board should focus on employers, the
remedial powers of the Board are "heavily oriented toward the repair of harm
inflicted on individual victims of antiunion action by employers." Id. at 1788.
203. The "fine" against the employer is only the amount of wages the employee
would have earned, subtracting out the employee's duty to mitigate damages.
Therefore, the actual amount the employer has to pay is "far too small to be a
significant deterrent." Id. at 1789. The amount of the "fine" for firing an organizer
is small compared to the additional costs unions bring with them. Id. at 1790-91.
In Hoffman, the amount the employer would have had to pay is large,
approximately $67,000, due to the four year delay during litigation. See Nancy
Cleeland, Employers Test Rulings on Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, at C1.
204. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940) (holding that the
NLRA gives the Board power to devise remedial, not punitive measures).
205. Sure-Tan established the doctrine of denying restatement to undocumented
workers since they cannot legally work after their status is discovered. See Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (7th Cir. 1984).
206. See Barmon, supra note 75, at 604- (pointing out that Del Rey Tortilleria,
Inc. continually defied the cease and desist orders of the Seventh Circuit). Non-
monetary sanctions were Castro's only available remedy because he was illegally in
the country, thus, reinstatement was not possible. See Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1061-62 (1998).
207. See supra notes 41-42.
208. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that the
protections of the FLSA are applicable to immigrants regardless of whether they
are documented or undocumented); Hudson & Schenck, supra note 24, at 367-69
(arguing that Title VII protects undocumented workers even though they should
not have been hired in the first place). But see Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc.,
153 F.3d 184, 186-87 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that an undocumented worker cannot
bring an action under Title VII because undocumented workers are not qualified to
hold any job position).
209. See Hudson & Schenck, supra note 24 (describing how according to the
EEOC, extending the protections of federal antidiscrimination laws to illegal
immigrants renders them less attractive as employees).
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individuals' collective bargaining rights.
Furthermore, enforcement of labor policy through
immigration law fails miserably. The enforcement strategy of the
INS focuses on employees, not the employer.210 This strategy runs
counter to the purpose of the INS' empowering statute, the
IRCA. 2 11 The INS also faces severe staffing problems inhibiting its
ability to enforce immigration policy. 212 Even when the INS
attempts enforcement, business and local communities may object
to the raids. 213
Along with the less effective enforcement, the penalties
imposed by the INS are often insufficient. Employers are Subject
to sanctions under the IRCA,214 which are often cited as an
effective deterrent by supporters. 215 However, these sanctions,
while highly visible, rarely occur. 216  What remains is an
understaffed, under-funded, and misguided agency that rarely
sanctions employers. 217  It is no wonder that employers will
flagrantly violate the law in order to hire illegal workers. 218
210. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Illegal Employers, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
Dec. 4, 2000, at 15, 16 (describing how INS enforcement within the workplace is
intended to be achieved by limiting employer access to illegal workers). After
implementing an employee-based sanction system in fiscal year 1999, employer-
sanction case completions dropped fifty-nine percent in fiscal year 1999 and an
additional thirty-one percent through the first eleven months of 2000. Id. at 16.
211. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose
of the IRCA.
212. See Elizabeth M. Dunne, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy:
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for
Undocumented Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 646 (2000) (showing that in California
in 1995 there were only 200 federal inspectors to investigate 873,400 private
employers). See also Nessel, supra note 159, at 360 n.60 ("Relative to other
enforcement programs in INS, worksite enforcement has received a relatively small
portion of INS' staffing and enforcement budget.") (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-33, ILLEGAL ALIENS: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO REDUCING
UNAUTHORIZED EMPLOYMENT EXIST 16 (1999)). See Camarota, supra note 24, at 22
(explaining that INS is severely understaffed with only 300 staffers enforcing the
prohibition of hiring illegal immigrants).
213. Roosevelt, supra note 197, at 69 (detailing an INS raid of the Nebraska
meatpacking industry resulting in damage to the state's economy that eventually
led the governor to endorse an amnesty for undocumented workers).
214. Employers face civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2002) and
criminal penalties, including jail time, under 8 U.S.C § 1324a(f)(1).
215. See Timothy M. Cox, A Call to Revisit Sure-Tan v. NLRB: Undocumented
Workers and Their Right to Backpay, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 505, 524 (2001) (referring
to a restaurant company's $1.9 million dollar settlement with the INS as a result of
hiring undocumented workers).
216. See Cleeland, supra note 31, at A30 (stating that a restaurant chain's $1.9
million settlement was an exception to the rule and that even when fines are
sought, they are often reduced or eventually forgiven).
217. Id.
218. See id. (quoting a Los Angeles union official saying employers have even
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Already, the ramifications of the Hoffman decision are
beginning to influence labor relations. Employers are using
immigration status as a way to deflect union grievances 219 and
lower wages.220 Hoffman is also appearing in courtrooms across
the country as employers attack other federal employment laws. 221
Excluding illegal immigrants from Title VII and the FLSA would
remove immigrants from the protection of the federal government
and open the floodgate for serious abuses by employers along with
a depression of wages. The loss of protection under these federal
acts would also result in the wholesale loss of both individual and
collective rights of an entire class of people.
CONCLUSION
Setting aside all the discussion of judicial deference,
congressional intent, and misapplied case law, the bottom line is
that the Supreme Court has dealt a blow to workers, both legal
and illegal in the United States. Those at the bottom rung of the
employment ladder are most affected. These are the workers who
need protection the most and who, by removing employer
sanctions, are hurt the most by the Court's decision. Since the
New Deal, workers have depended on their ability to act
collectively and to unionize to improve their work environments
and wages. No group of people needs the ability to act collectively
more than new immigrants.
As the economy evolves, the Court will play a major role in
shaping the lives of American workers. Only time will tell if this
decision is the last erosion of workers' rights, or if the FLSA or
Title VII will be the next to fall. By imposing another hurdle in
helped illegal immigrants get over the border).
219. See Cleeland, supra note 203, at C1 (reporting on a worker in Kentucky and
a worker in Nebraska who were asked for their immigration documents after filing
a sexual harassment claim and a workers' compensation claim respectively).
220. See id. at C5 (reporting an attorney representing an employer accused of
paying workers less than minimum wage as citing Hoffman and claiming that
illegal immigrants should not be entitled to backpay). The attorney stated, "I am
sure you are aware of the ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States that
illegal immigrants do not have the same rights as U.S. citizens." Id.
221. See Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 C 6320, 2002 WL 31175471, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (rejecting employer's claim that Hoffman precludes payment of
earned wages for work actually performed); Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc.,
214 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting argument that Hoffman
applies to FLSA situations, but admitting the arguments for and against FLSA
protection of immigrants are remarkably similar to the arguments in Hoffman); De
La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture, No. 01-2160, 2002 WL 31007752, at * 2
(C.D. Ill. 2002) (rejecting the argument that Hoffman precludes backpay awards in
Title VII discrimination claims).
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the already difficult task of unionization, the Court is delaying and
perhaps denying many workers the things many people take for
granted: good wages, a safe workplace, health care, and a work
environment free from fear and intimidation.
